Much of the drama was provided unintentionally by President Clinton's conduct of relations with Beijing. Having begun his term seven years ago by exalting the economic dimensions of foreign policy to the highest level, he now concludes it the same way. In between, however, Clinton linked trade with human rights, then delinked it; proclaimed "strategic partnership" with Beijing, then nearly came to war in the Taiwan Strait; and eagerly sought to bring the PRC into the World Trade Organization only to refuse China's best offer a year ago. A man more skilled at managing crises, many of his own making, than setting strategy, Clinton's touch was visible from start to finish.

The run-up to the PNTR was a good illustration. By now the story is well known of how Zhu Rongji brought the President an unexpectedly good WTO deal in April 1999, confident of Washington's signals that the market opening measures would be accepted for the Chinese concessions they were. But Clinton had just come off the impeachment crisis, heavily indebted to the Congressional Democrats; he was also waging war in Kosovo. Moreover, as a President adept at stealing the Republicans' issues, he was acutely aware of his own party's opposition to free trade deals. (In 1994, he had had to rely on Republican votes to pass NAFTA.) So on this occasion, the President judged that the time was unripe for a struggle. An astonished Zhu Rongji then publicly lobbied against him and in a few days, Clinton reversed himself, but not in time to rescue the deal. Then came delay, followed by the Chinese Embassy bombing, to be succeeded by yet more negotiation.

All of this gave the opposition, especially among American labor unions, lots of time to organize. What appeared bad timing to the White House in spring 1999 became disastrous timing in spring 2000 with the onset of presidential politicking. Vice-President Gore lost his enthusiasm for PNTR when he needed AFL-CIO support to defeat an unexpected challenge from Senator Bill Bradley in the party primaries. Then, at Seattle, the President himself rattled his colleagues when he sympathized visibly with the demonstrators against the WTO. The Republicans could indulge this only so far and their leaders signalled that they would not carry the vote unless Clinton recruited more of his party to the cause. All of this encouraged China's critics.

The Democrats, already divided by free trade, were even more conflicted on China policy. Human rightists, environmentalists, and unionists, each a significant Democratic constituency, all see China as the enemy. Some Republicans also fear China. But the GOP had less of a problem not only because of their business support, but because the "opening to China" bears a Republican patent.

Last, and far from least, one lobby influential with both sides wanted China in the WTO. This was Taiwan. And for once, the Taiwanese and their opponents in Beijing were able to avoid spitting in the soup. It did not start out that way. The late summer of 1999 was marked by high tension after ROC President Lee Teng-hui enunciated a "two-state" doctrine that challenged the hoary One-China theology. Then Beijing warned the Taiwanese voters not to elect the pro- independence DPP candidate as their next president. But they did; and the U.S. Congress riposted the Chinese threats with an enhanced arms package, which Clinton promised to veto. These darkening clouds were dispelled when Taiwan's new President, Chen Shui-bian, proved a capable theologian. His May 20th inaugural speech gave enough to reassure Washington and Beijing that he would not create a crisis over One China.

The Republican president contender, George W. Bush, also did his part. His major foreign policy speech in November 1999 described China as a "competitor"; more recently he has explained that competitor did not necessarily mean adversary. By endorsing the bill Bush also claimed the mantle of the "opening to China" worn by every Republican president since Nixon.

All of the strings were eventually pulled. Gore announced his unqualified support of PNTR on April 30 buried inside a general foreign policy speech. The President also thoroughly plied the fence-sitters, using the usual blandishments; after all, this was going to be his legacy. (Clinton delivered 73 Democrats, the number required by the GOP leadership.) The Republicans mostly rejected the arguments of would-be new Cold Warriors. And both Taipei and Beijing proved they could be pragmatic in the common interest. These were the very elements that had been missing, in whole or in part, through much of the previous seven difficult years.

The House debate itself, while intense, showed that each side's main arguments had serious flaws. Those in favor had a good case when they stuck to details; after all, PNTR lays the burden for opening new markets on China. It was harder to trace the connection between trade and democracy because China's political evolution is an erratic zig-zag, not a straight line.

Those against PNTR were equally unable to show that twenty years of annual votes on China's trading status made a convincing piece of leverage. Neither Tiananmen Square (1989) nor the Strait crisis of 1996 lost China its position. It was even more difficult to persuade Congress that the American economy, at full throttle, would lose from the opportunity to sell more to China.

Finally, some Representatives relished the annual opportunity to roast China. For them, a special commission was created. This small forum won't be the same as the House Chamber; but it will have to do.