| S 693 IS 106th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 693
To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan,
and for other purposes.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 24, 1999
Mr. HELMS (for himself and Mr. TORRICELLI) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
A BILL
To assist in the enhancement of the security
of Taiwan, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act."
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings: --
(1) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United
States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both societies.
(2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a major
political transformation, and Taiwan is today a true multiparty democracy with a political
system separate from and totally unlike that of the People's Republic of China.
(3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free market
principles and is separate and distinct from the People's Republic of China.
(4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United States
Government withdrew diplomatic recognition of the government on Taiwan as the legitimate
government of China, neither at that time nor since has the United States Government
adopted a formal position as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than to state that
status must be decided by peaceful means. Any determination of the ultimate status of
Taiwan must have the express consent of the people on Taiwan.
(5) The government on Taiwan no longer claims to be the
sole legitimate government of all of China.
(6) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) states that
--
(A) peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area are in
the political, security, and economic interests of the United States and are of
international concern;
(B) the decision of the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined
by peaceful means;
(C) the United States would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other
than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security
of the Western Pacific region and of grave concern to the United States;
(D) the United States will maintain the capacity to resist any form of coercion that
jeopardizes the security, or the social or the economic system, of the people on Taiwan;
and
(E) the preservation and enhancement of the human rights
of all the people on Taiwan are objectives of the United States.
(7) On the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan Relations
Act establishes on the part of the United States a continuing connection with and concern
for Taiwan, its people, and their ability to maintain themselves free of coercion and free
of the use of force against them. The maintenance by Taiwan of forces adequate for defense
and deterrence is in the interest of the United States in that it helps to maintain peace
in the Taiwan Strait area.
(8) Since 1954, when the United States and Taiwan signed
the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and Taiwan have maintained a defense and
security relationship that has contributed greatly to freedom, peace, and stability in
Taiwan and the East Asia and Pacific regions.
(9) The United States and Taiwan no longer conduct joint
training missions, have no direct military lines of communication, and have only limited
military-to-military contacts. This lack of communication and interoperation between the
United States and Taiwan hinders planning for the defense of Taiwan and could prove
detrimental in the event of future aggression against Taiwan.
(10) Since 1979, the United States has continued to sell
defensive weapons to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, and such sales
have helped Taiwan maintain its autonomy and freedom in the face of persistent hostility
from the People's Republic of China. However, pressures to delay, deny, and reduce arms
sales to Taiwan have been prevalent since the signing of the August 17, 1982, communiqué
with the People's Republic of China. Over time, such delays, denials, and reductions could
prevent Taiwan from maintaining a sufficient capability for self-defense.
(11) As has been affirmed on several occasions by the
executive branch of Government, the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act take legal
precedence over any communiqué with the People's Republic of China.
(12) The People's Republic of China has consistently refused to renounce the use of force
against Taiwan and has repeatedly threatened force against Taiwan, including implied
threats by unnamed People's Republic of China officials on January 10, 1999, who warned
Taiwan not to participate in the development of theater missile defense capabilities with
the United States.
(13) The missile firings by the People's Republic of China near Taiwan in August 1995 and
March 1996 clearly demonstrate the willingness of the People's Republic of China to use
forceful tactics to limit the freedom of the people on Taiwan.
(14) As most nations in East Asia reduce military spending, the People's Republic of China
continues a major and comprehensive military buildup.
(15) This military buildup includes the development of advanced ballistic and cruise
missiles that will incorporate precision guidance capability and the construction of new
imaging, radar, navigation, and electronic intelligence satellites that will help target
and guide ballistic and cruise missiles. According to the Department of Defense report
entitled "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," submitted to Congress in
February 1999, the size of the missile force of the People's Republic of China is expected
to grow substantially and, by 2005, the People's Republic of China will possess an
"overwhelming advantage" in offensive missiles vis-a-vis Taiwan. The Department
of Defense has also noted that the People's Republic of China may already possess the
capability to damage satellite optical sensors with lasers, is researching advanced
anti-satellite lasers that could blind United States intelligence satellites, and is
procuring radio frequency weapons that disable electronic equipment. These missile and
anti-satellite capabilities pose a grave threat to Taiwan.
(16) This military buildup also includes the construction
or procurement from abroad of advanced naval systems, including Russian Kilo submarines
that are difficult to detect, Russian technology to assist the development of new
nuclear-powered attack submarines, Russian Sovremenny class destroyers armed with
supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, a new long-range, all-weather naval attack
aircraft called the JH-7, and new indigenous land-attack cruise missiles that could be
launched from submarines, ships, and naval attack aircraft. These naval capabilities pose
a grave threat of blockade to Taiwan.
(17) This military buildup also includes the improvement of air combat capabilities by
procuring and co-producing hundreds of Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, seeking to purchase
Russian Su-30 all-weather attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with advanced air-to-air
missiles such as the Russian R-77 missile and other precision guided munitions,
constructing the indigenously designed J-10 fighter, and seeking advanced airborne warning
and control systems from abroad. These capabilities pose a grave airborne threat to
Taiwan.
(18) Because of the introduction of advanced submarines
into the Taiwan Strait area by the People's Republic of China and the increasing
capability of the People's Republic of China to blockade Taiwan, Taiwan needs to acquire
diesel-powered submarines in order to maintain a capability to counter a blockade, to
conduct antisubmarine warfare training, and for other purposes.
(19) Because of the democratic form of government on Taiwan and the historically
nonaggressive foreign policy of Taiwan, it is highly unlikely that Taiwan would use
submarines in an offensive manner.
(20) The current defense relationship between the United States and Taiwan is deficient in
terms of its capacity over the long term to counter and deter potential aggression against
Taiwan by the People's Republic of China.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF
CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the
military departments should make every effort to reserve additional positions for Taiwan
officers at the National Defense University, the senior war colleges, and the military
academies; and
(2) the Secretary of State should, when considering
foreign military sales to Taiwan--
(A) take into account the special status of Taiwan; and
(B) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan has full and
timely access to price and availability data for defense articles and defense services.
SEC. 4.
DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.
(a) INCREASE IN TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
IN TAIWAN- Upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the President
shall use funds available to the Department of Defense under the Arms Export Control Act
for the assignment or detail of additional technical staff to the American Institute in
Taiwan.
(b) ANNUAL REPORTS- Beginning 60 days after the next round
of arms talks between the United States and Taiwan, and annually thereafter, the President
shall submit a report to Congress--
(1) detailing each of Taiwan's requests for purchase of
defense articles and defense services during the one-year period ending on the date of the
report;
(2) describing the defense needs asserted by Taiwan as justification for those requests;
and
(3) describing any decision to reject, postpone, or modify any such request that was made
during the one-year period ending on the date of the report, the level at which the final
decision was made, and a justification for the decision.
SEC. 5.
STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
(a) MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF
TAIWAN- Congress finds that any determination of the nature or quantity of defense
articles or defense services to be made available to Taiwan that is made on any basis
other than the defense needs of Taiwan, whether pursuant to the August 17, 1982,
Communiqué signed with the People's Republic of China, or any similar executive
agreement, order, or policy would violate the intent of Congress in the enactment of
section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)).
(b) PLAN-
(1) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall develop a plan for the enhancement of programs and
arrangements for operational training and exchanges of personnel between the armed forces
of the United States and Taiwan for work in threat analysis, doctrine, force planning,
operational methods, and other areas. The plan shall provide for exchanges of officers up
to and including general and flag officers in the grade of O-10.
(2) REPORT- Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit a report to Congress, in classified or unclassified form,
containing the plan required under paragraph (1).
(3) IMPLEMENTATION- Not later than 30 days after the date on which the report described in
paragraph (2) is submitted or required to be submitted, the Secretary of Defense shall
implement the plan contained in the report.
(c) COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN
MILITARY COMMANDS - Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall establish secure direct communications between the United
States Pacific military command and the Taiwan military command.
(d) MISSILE DEFENSE EQUIPMENT- Subject to subsection (h),
the President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost,
theater missile defense equipment and related items, including--
(1) ground-based and naval-based missile defense systems;
and
(2) reconnaissance and communications systems, as may be
necessary to target and cue missile defense systems sold to Taiwan.
(e) SATELLITE EARLY WARNING DATA - Subject to subsection
(h), the President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost,
satellite early warning data.
(f) AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT - Subject to subsection (h), the President is authorized to make
available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, modern air-defense equipment, including
the following:
(1) AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.
(2) Additional advanced fighters and airborne warning and
control systems (AWACS).
(3) Equipment to better defend airfields from air and
missile attack.
(4) Communications infrastructure that enables coordinated
joint-force air defense of Taiwan.
(g) NAVAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS - Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost,
defensive systems that counter the development by the People's Republic of China of new
naval capabilities, including defense systems such as--
(1) diesel-powered submarines;
(2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne systems,
capable of detecting new Kilo and advanced Chinese nuclear submarines;
(3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis
destroyers, capable of defeating Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles; and
(4) communications systems that better enable Taiwan to
conduct joint-force naval defense operations.
(h) RELATION TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT - Nothing in this
section supersedes or modifies the application of section 36 of the Arms Export Control
Act to the sale of any defense article or defense service under this section.
END
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